Is agency skin-deep? Surface attributes influence infants' sensitivity to goal-directed action by Guajardo, J. J. & Woodward, Amanda
Is Agency Skin Deep? Surface Attributes
Influence Infants’ Sensitivity
to Goal-Directed Action
Jose J. Guajardo and Amanda L. Woodward
Department of Psychology
University of Chicago
Three studies investigated the role of surface attributes in infants’ identification of
agents, using a habituation paradigm designed to tap infants’ interpretation of grasp-
ing as goal directed (Woodward, 1998). When they viewed a bare human hand grasp-
ing objects, 7- and 12-month-old infants focused on the relation between the hand
and its goal. When the surface properties of the hand were obscured by a glove, how-
ever, neither 7- nor 12-month-old infants represented its actions as goal directed
(Study 1). Next, infants were shown that the gloved hands were part of a person either
prior to (Study 2) or during (Study 3) the habituation procedure. Infants who actively
monitored the gloved person in Study 2 and older infants in Study 3 interpreted the
gloved reaches as goal directed. Thus, varying the extent to which an entity is identi-
fiable as a person impacts infants’ interpretation of the entity as an agent.
The distinction between animate agents and inanimate objects is fundamental to
both everyday and abstract acts of human cognition. Observing a child chasing a
soccer ball, we are not surprised when the child swerves to avoid a tree, but we
would be if the ball behaved like the child. We identify the child as an animate
agent, and therefore interpret her behavior as expressing her underlying goals or
intentions. We understand that this interpretation is not appropriately extended to
inanimate objects such as balls. Our ability to quickly categorize entities as agents
or inanimate objects is supported by rich perceptual regularities. Animate agents
differ from inanimate objects in their typical shapes, rigidity, surface properties,
sounds, and patterns of motion. These perceptual attributes correlate with the be-
havioral and psychological attributes that are central to folk conceptions of agents
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and thereby serve as concrete indicators of the unobservable, yet conceptually cen-
tral, qualities of agents.
In this article, we investigate the state of this fundamental distinction during in-
fancy. Recent findings indicate that during the first year of life, infants begin to in-
terpret some observed behaviors not as purely physical motions through space but
instead as goal-directed actions (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999;
Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Legerstee, Barna, & DiAdamo, 2000;
Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). Thus, infants seem to have some
knowledge about the core attributes of agents, in particular, their goal directedness.
This then raises the question of how infants first identify the class of entities whose
motions are properly understood as goal directed.
One well-known answer to this question is that infants initially detect potential
agents based exclusively on their patterns of motion. Several related theories start
from the assumption that infants are innately endowed with abstract conceptions of
intentionalityandthenpropose that theseabstract systemsare triggeredbyparticular
patterns of motion. Although there are different variants of this position, they con-
verge in predicting that infants will initially attribute agency to a broad range of enti-
ties, so long as the entity moves in the right way. To illustrate, in an influential theo-
retical paper, Premack (1990) proposed that if an entity exhibits self-propelled
motion, then infants will perceive it as a goal-directed agent solely on these grounds.
ThisproposalwaselaboratedbyBaron-Cohen(1995),whobroadened thedefinition
of self-propelled motion to include biological motion. He proposed that
the visual input might look as shapeless as an ameba, as weird as a giraffe, or as mini-
mal as a stick insect. Because of their self-propelled motion, all these are instantly in-
terpretable [by infants] as agents with goals and desires. (p. 34)
Gergely, Csibra, and their colleagues put forth a related but importantly distinct
formulation (Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et
al., 1995; see also Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003). They
proposed that infants interpret observed events as goal directed based on a system
for detecting rational patterns of motion with respect to a goal. This system is acti-
vated whenever infants view motion that can be interpreted as the most efficient
route to a goal given situational constraints, regardless of the appearance of the
moving entity. That is, infants are argued to “apply a psychological interpretational
system which represents the observed behaviors in teleological terms … and do so
without any a priori ontological commitment concerning the types of objects
which exhibit these behaviors” (Csibra et al., 1999, p. 261). Recently, Király et al.
summarized this general position as follows:
Several theories propose innately based, abstract, and domain-specific representa-
tional systems specialized for identifying intentional agents … While these models
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differ in several important respects, they all assume an initially wide scope of entities
… that infants can recognize as goal-directed from very early on (including unfamil-
iar actions of humans or unfamiliar agents with no human features). This generality
in scope is due to the fact that these theories all postulate or imply sensitivity to ab-
stract behavioural cues … that indicate agency … irrespective of previous experience
with the types of agents or actions that exhibit these cues. (p. 753)
Consistent with these proposals, there is evidence that by 12 months of age, in-
fants respond to unusual entities as if they were agents in some situations. Much of
this evidence comes from the programmatic studies conducted by Gergely, Csibra,
and their colleagues. Across several experiments, these researchers report that
12-month-old, and sometimes 9-month-old, infants view the motions of two-di-
mensional animated shapes in accord with the rationality principle—that is, the be-
lief that agents seek efficient paths to reach goals (Csibra et al., 2003; Csibra et al.,
1999; Gergely et al., 1995). To illustrate, in one study (Gergely et al., 1995)
12-month-old infants were habituated to a repeating scene in which a shape took a
circuitous path around a barrier to reach another shape (the “goal”). Then, infants
were shown test events in which the barrier had been removed and the shape
moved either in the same circuitous path to reach the goal (irrational motion) or in
a straight line to the goal (rational motion). Infants looked longer at the former test
event than the latter, despite the fact that it repeated the same path of motion as dur-
ing habituation. Gergely, Csibra, and colleagues concluded that infants interpreted
the circuitous path as irrational, and therefore surprising, given the removal of the
barrier. In addition to these findings, other researchers have reported that 12- to
15-month-old infants respond to novel objects or animated shapes as if they were
agents when these entities behave in a manner designed to be consistent with this
interpretation—for example when these entities respond contingently to social
partners (S. Johnson, Booth, & O’Hearn, 2001; S. Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey,
1998; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003b; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004).
Based on these findings it might be concluded that infants are different from
adults in their identification of agents, relying not on the rich perceptual attributes
of real-world agents but instead attending only to the patterns of motion that spec-
ify agency. To illustrate, imagine (a) a snake lying still and straight across a hiking
trail, and (b) a blue plastic sphere rolling on an irregular trajectory over and around
objects in its path, apparently in pursuit of another sphere. To a mature observer,
the first of these is automatically identified as an animate agent, despite its lack of
motion. Moreover, no matter how complex the behavior of the second, mature ob-
servers would never classify it as an agent. The theories and findings just described
suggest that infants would, at least initially, make the opposite attributions.
To be clear, the relevant point is not whether or not motion provides information
about agency, but rather, whether motion is the sole source of evidence considered
in determining whether an entity is an agent. Adults certainly use patterns of mo-
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tion as one source of information about agency, and they might identify an entity as
an agent based on its movements in the absence of other featural information, for
example, when an indistinct entity is seen to move through the night. However, the
claim is that infants attribute agency based exclusively on patterns of motion re-
gardless of the other perceptual evidence available to them. Indeed, infants have
been argued to respond to entities that have almost no attributes in common with
real-world agents (e.g., two-dimensional geometrical shapes on a computer screen)
as if they were agents.
This claim seems at odds with other evidence. For one, from the earliest months
of life, infants are sensitive to the rich perceptual attributes of real-world agents (in
particular, people), including facial configurations (M. Johnson, 1992), biological
patterns of motion (Bertenthal, 1993), and the sounds they produce (Spelke, 1976).
Moreover, infants connect these perceptual attributes to their developing knowl-
edge of how agents behave. For example, by 6 months of age, infants expect peo-
ple, but not inanimate objects, to engage in self-propelled motion and conversa-
tional exchanges (e.g., Kosugi & Fujita, 2002; Legerstee et al., 2000; Molina, Van
de Walle, Condry, & Spelke, in press; Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland, 1996;
Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995; for a review, see Rakison & Poulin-Dubois,
2001).
Further, infants as young as 6 months of age differentiate between people and
inanimate objects in paradigms designed to assess their sensitivity to the goal
directedness of actions. To illustrate, in one study (Woodward, 1998), infants
viewed events in which a person reached toward and grasped one of two objects.
To a mature observer this action is most readily described in terms of the relation
between agent and goal (“she grasped the bear”) rather than in terms of the strictly
physical properties of the person’s motion. That is, this action is interpreted as be-
ing goal directed. Infants were habituated to one reaching event, and then pre-
sented with test events that varied either the relation between actor and goal while
preserving other aspects of the actor’s motion (new object events), or preserved the
relation between actor and goal while varying the physical properties of the actor’s
reach (new side events; see Figure 1). If infants represented the habituation event in
terms of the actor–goal relation, then they were predicted to look longer on test
events that vary this relation than on events that preserve it. Infants as young as 5 to
6 months of age responded in this way, so long as the actor they observed was a
person. When they viewed inanimate “actors,” such as rods, arm-shaped oc-
cluders, or mechanical claws, infants did not respond in this way. Subsequent find-
ings further support the conclusion that infants interpret human grasps but not the
grasps of inanimate claws as being goal directed, even in the potentially more in-
formative context of seeing the claw move the object (Jovanovic et al., 2003).
Thus, during the first year of life, infants analyze certain human actions in terms of
their goal structure, but they seem not to readily extend this interpretation to the
similar motions of inanimate objects.
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These findings suggest a very different conclusion from the position described
earlier: Rather than broadly attributing agency based on abstract patterns of
motion, infants seem to draw on their knowledge of the attributes of familiar
agents. These studies were designed to more rigorously test this possibility. In the
Woodward (1998) studies, the human and inanimate actors differed on many
dimensions, including the presence or absence of biological motion. Given
Baron-Cohen’s (1995) suggestion that biological motion could be considered a
type of self-propelled motion, it is possible that this featural difference accounted
for the difference in infants’ interpretation of the human and inanimate actors’ mo-
tions. To test this possibility, we presented infants with agents that were equated in
terms of their motion properties but varied on a dimension that is diagnostic of
animacy from a mature perspective, namely, surface texture. Surface properties are
strong cues to animacy for adults—recall the snake lying across the trail—and in-
fants are also sensitive to the surface properties that are typical of animate and in-
animate objects (Smith & Heise, 1992).
We adapted the method developed in Woodward (1998), this time presenting all
infants with events in which a person grasped one of two toys with her hand. We
varied the surface texture of the hand by having the presenting experimenter wear a
metallic glove. In Study 1, infants viewed events like those depicted in Figure 1—
only the actor’s arm and hand were visible. One group of infants (the bare hand
condition) saw the actor’s bare hand and the other (the gloved hand condition) saw
it gloved. In all other respects—the biological patterns of motion, the shape of the
hand, and the way in which the fingers articulated on the object—the two events
were identical. In terms of self-propelledness, the two events were equally ambig-
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FIGURE 1 Sample habituation and test events for Experiments 1 and 2.
uous. Because the arm entered from the side of the stage, there was no evidence,
beyond the biological nature of the arm’s motion, that the arm was self-propelled.
Thus, if infants rely on patterns of motion to identify agents, they would be pre-
dicted to represent the grasping events as goal-directed in both conditions. How-
ever, if infants are influenced by the typical features of agents, then altering the
surface properties of the hand, particularly when only the hand itself is visible,
might disrupt infants’ interpretation of the grasping events as goal-directed.
We tested infants at two ages, 7 and 12 months, because the first of these ap-
proximates the younger ages tested by Woodward (1998), and the second approxi-
mates the ages tested in studies reporting breadth in infants’attributions of agency.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants. Sixty-four infants from a large metropolitan area participated
in Study 1. The infants were all full term (at least 37 weeks gestation). Their par-
ents had been contacted through mailings and advertisements and were offered
$10 to reimburse them for their travel expenses. The 32 infants in the 7-month age
group ranged in age from 5 months, 26 days to 8 months, 9 days (M = 7 months, 11
days). The 32 infants in the 12-month age group ranged in age from 11 months, 1
day to 13 months, 7 days (M = 11 months, 27 days). At each age, 16 infants saw an
actor grasp a toy with a gloved hand (gloved hand condition), and 16 infants saw
her grasp a toy with her bare hand (the bare hand condition). At 12 months there
were 7 girls and 9 boys in the gloved hand condition and 8 girls and 8 boys in the
bare hand condition. At 7 months there were 8 girls and 8 boys in the gloved hand
condition and 6 girls and 10 boys in the bare hand condition. Thirteen additional
infants began the procedure but were excluded from the final sample due to failure
to complete all trials (three 7-month-olds and four 12-month-olds) or because of an
error in the procedure (one 7-month-old and five 12-month-olds).
Procedure. Sitting in either an infant seat or on a parent’s lap, the infants
faced a stage approximately 30 in. (76.2 cm) away on which two toys were posi-
tioned on 10-in.-tall (25.4 cm) pedestals that stood approximately 10 in. (25.4 cm)
apart. One toy was a white teddy bear and the other was a multicolored ball. The
back and sides of the stage were draped in black fabric. Infants were filmed by a
video camera that was mounted between the toys with its lens protruding through
the back curtain. Between trials, a white screen was raised to block the stage and
toys from the infant’s view.
During habituation, infants viewed the actor reach for the same toy, in the same
location, on each trial (see Figure 1). In both conditions, the infants saw only the
actor’s arm and hand, and the actor’s arm was covered in a red sleeve. In the gloved
366 GUAJARDO AND WOODWARD
hand condition, the actor wore a metallic gold glove that covered all traces of her
skin. In the bare hand condition, she did not wear the glove. At each age and in
each condition 8 infants saw the actor reach to the right side of the stage, except in
the 7-month bare hand condition, in which 7 infants saw the actor reach to the right
side of the stage. At 12 months, 8 infants in each condition saw the actor grasp the
bear during habituation. At 7 months, 9 infants in the gloved hand condition and 10
infants in the bare hand condition saw her grasp the bear.
An observer coded the infant’s looking online from a video monitor, pressing a
computer key when the infant was looking at the area containing the two toys and
the actor’s arm. The observer could not see the experimental events and did not
know which condition was being presented. A computer program calculated the
total looking time for each trial and determined when the infant had met the habitu-
ation criterion (Pinto, 1994). The infant’s looking was coded beginning when the
actor’s hand made contact with the toy. This was accomplished by having another
experimenter watch the event and signal the computer to begin timing at the appro-
priate point.
The trial ended when the infant looked away for 2 consecutive sec or when 120
sec had elapsed. The habituation criterion was calculated using the first three trials
that totaled to at least 12 sec. When the infant’s looking times on three consecutive
trials were less then 50% of the average of the first three trials, the habituation
phase ended. If the infant did not meet the habituation criterion after 14 trials, the
habituation phase was ended and the test trials began.
Immediately after habituation, the toys’ positions were reversed while the
screen blocked the infant’s view. The screen was then lowered and infants received
one familiarization trial on which the actor did not reach into the stage to introduce
them to the toys’ new positions.
After the familiarization trial, infants saw two kinds of test events in alternation,
for a total of three trials of each type. On new object trials, the actor reached to the
same side of the stage as during habituation, now grasping the other toy. On new
side trials, the actor reached to the other side of the stage to grasp the same toy as
during habituation. At each age and in each condition, 8 infants began the test
phase with a new side trial except in the 7-month gloved hand condition, in which 9
infants began with a new side trial.
Reliability coding. To assess reliability, a second independent observer cod-
ed each infant from the videotape. The two observers were strongly correlated in
their judgments of looking times on the two kinds of test trials (r = .96). Because
this correlation could be inflated by the fact that the first observer determined when
the trial ended, we undertook a second, more conservative analysis comparing the
two observers’ judgments of the endpoint for each trial. The online and video ob-
servers were scored as agreeing if they judged the trial to end at the same time, as
indicated by there being no gap between the computer tone signaling the end of the
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trial for the video observer and the tone recorded on the tape for the online ob-
server. The tone was 0.2 sec in duration. Thus, when observers agreed, they were
within 0.2 sec in their estimation of the trial ending. The observers agreed on 91%
of the trial endings for 7-month-olds and 93% for 12-month-olds. To assess the
possibility of observer bias, the disagreements were classified as early (the online
observer ended the trial earlier than the video observer) or late (the online observer
ended the trial later than the video observer) and as occurring on new object test tri-
als or new side test trials. The disagreements were distributed randomly across
these categories at both ages and in both conditions, all Fisher’s exact p > .99.
Results
Table 1 summarizes infants’ attention during habituation and test trials. An initial
concern was whether there would be an overall difference in infants’ interest in the
gloved and ungloved hands. One way of investigating this possibility is to compare
attention during habituation in the two conditions. A repeated measures analyses
of variance (ANOVA) with condition (gloved hand vs. bare hand) and age group (7
months vs. 12 months) as between-subjects factors was conducted on infants’
looking times on the first and last three habituation trials.1 This analysis revealed
main effects for trial, F(5, 300) = 36.30, p < .0001, indicating a decline in looking
across the habituation phase; and for age group, F(1, 60) = 6.70, p < .05, reflecting
longer looking times on the part of 7-month-olds, and no other reliable effects. No-
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1There was positive skew in the habituation data for this study and for Studies 2 and 3. For this rea-
son, all analyses involving habituation data were conducted after the data were subjected to a log
transformation.
TABLE 1
Attention During Habituation Trials and the Three Test Trials of Each Type






Average Looking Time (in Sec)
Habituation Test Trials
First 3 Last 3 New Side New Object
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
7 months
Bare hand 8.4 0.7 16.8 2.5 7.8 1.9 6.1 0.9 8.7 1.6
Gloved hand 7.9 0.6 19.7 3.7 5.9 0.8 9.3 2.8 6.9 1.3
12 months
Bare hand 9.8 0.8 8.8 1.1 5.4 1.4 5.4 0.9 8.1 1.3
Gloved hand 8.7 0.7 13.7 2.6 3.8 0.7 6.0 0.9 6.8 0.8
tably, there was not a reliable main effect of condition, F(1, 60) = 0.03, p > .8. A
similar analysis conducted on the number of trials required to meet the habituation
criterion revealed no reliable effects. Thus, these analyses did not indicate that in-
fants differed in their overall levels of attention to the gloved and bare hands. Four
infants in the 12-month bare hand group and 1 in each of the other three groups
reached 14 habituation trials without meeting criterion.
The principle analyses concerned infants’ responses on the two kinds of test
trials. Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of the sex of the in-
fant, the order of test trials, the side of reach during habituation, or the object
grasped during habituation. Therefore, subsequent analyses collapsed across
these dimensions. Infants’ looking times were averaged across the three trials of
each type, and a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on these scores with
condition (gloved hand vs. bare hand) and age group (7 months vs. 12 months)
as the between-subjects variables and trial type (new object vs. new side) as the
within-subjects variable. This analysis revealed a Condition × Trial Type interac-
tion, F(1, 60) = 7.60, p < .01, indicating that infants in the two conditions re-
sponded differently on the two kinds of test trials, and no other reliable effects.2
Planned contrasts revealed that infants in the bare hand condition looked longer
on new object trials than on new side trials, t(31) = 3.29, p < .005, but infants in
the gloved hand condition did not differ in their attention to the two kinds of test
trials, t(31) < 1. There was no indication that this pattern varied as a function of
age; neither the main effect nor any interactions involving age approached statis-
tical significance, all ps > .19. The absence of a significant main effect of condi-
tion, F(1, 60) = 0.025, p > .8, further indicated that infants were equally attentive
to the bare and gloved hands.
Although the ANOVA did not indicate reliable differences between the two age
groups, follow-up analyses were conducted to assess whether each age group re-
flected the pattern shown by the sample as a whole. Paired comparisons of infants’
looking times on new object and new side trials were conducted for each age group
within each condition.3 These analyses indicated that neither age group differenti-
ated between the two kinds of test trials in the gloved hand condition, t(15) = 1.10,
p > .2 at 12 months, and t(15) = 0.71, p > .49 at 7 months. In the bare hand condi-
tion, 12-month-olds looked reliably longer on new object trials than new side tri-
als, t(16) = 2.86, p < .05, and 7-month-olds showed a trend in the same direction,
t(15) = 1.88, p < .08. This trend reached significance when the infant who did not
meet the habituation criterion was excluded from the analysis, t(14) = 2.20, p < .05.
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2The data from the 7-month-olds had positive skew. When the data were log transformed, to reduce
this skew, the results of the Age Group × Condition × Trial Type ANOVA were similar to those reported
for the untransformed scores: There was a main effect of trial type, F(1, 60) = 6.12, p < .05, qualified by
a Condition × Trial Type interaction, F(1, 60) = 4.55, p < .05, and no other reliable effects.
3The data for the 7-month-olds were first log transformed to reduce positive skew.
Excluding nonhabituators did not alter the findings for the 12-month-olds or for
the 7-month-olds in the gloved hand condition.
A secondary question concerns whether infants recovered attention during test
trials relative to the end of habituation. Both new side and new object test trials pre-
sented infants with new information—the toys were in new positions on both kinds
of trials, the arm reached to a new location on new side trials, and a new object was
grasped on new object trials. To further investigate infants’ attention to these
changes, planned contrasts compared infants’ average looking times on each kind
of test trial to their average looking times on the last three habituation trials. This
analysis strategy, although potentially informative, should be evaluated with cau-
tion. Because the final habituation trials are selected to be lower than others, across
the board recovery is difficult to interpret. Moreover, because attention tends to de-
cline across the experimental session (infants habituate to all aspects of the experi-
ment), across the board failure to recover is also difficult to interpret. Twelve-
month-olds in the bare hand condition recovered on new object trials, t(15) = 2.89,
p < .05, but not on new side trials, t(15) = 0.79, p > .4. This pattern is consistent
with prior findings in suggesting that despite the new elements in new side trials,
infants did not show a strong novelty response on these trials (see Woodward,
1998, 2003). In the gloved hand condition, 12-month-olds recovered on both kinds
of test trials, t(15) = 3.35, p < .05 for new object trials, and t(15) = 3.53, p < .05 for
new side trials. Seven-month-olds did not show reliable recovery in either condi-
tion for either type of test event: In the bare hand condition, t(15) = 1.22, p > .2 for
new object trials, and t(15) = –0.16, p > .8 for new side trials; in the gloved hand
condition, t(15) = 0.94, p > .3 for new object trials, and t(15) = 1.25, p > .2 for new
side trials.
Discussion
When they viewed grasping by a bare hand, 7- and 12-month-old infants selec-
tively encoded the relation between the actor and the object she grasped. Having
been habituated to one grasping action, infants looked longer on test trials that dis-
rupted the relation between actor and object than at test trials that disrupted her pat-
terns of motion while preserving this relation. These results replicate prior findings
(Jovanovic et al., 2003; Woodward, 1998, 1999, 2003) and further support the con-
clusion that infants interpret human grasps as goal directed during the first year of
life. In contrast, infants who saw the grasp performed by a gloved hand did not re-
spond systematically on test trials. This difference between the two conditions
seemed not to be a product of infants’ finding the glove distracting or aversive;
across both habituation and test trials infants were equally attentive to the gloved
and bare hand events. There was no indication of a difference between the two age
groups in the overall analysis, and the two age groups showed comparable patterns
when analyzed separately. These findings suggest that the typical surface features
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of agents are relevant to infants’ determination that an action is goal-directed at
both 7 and 12 months.
In contrast to the proposal that infants identify a broad range of entities as po-
tential agents based only on a small set of motion cues, the findings of Study 1 indi-
cate that infants also rely on other kinds of featural support to identify agents. To
adult eyes, the gloved hands were readily identifiable as the hands of a person—
they were shaped like hands, moved like hands, and articulated on the toys like
hands. Even so, many of the attributes infants normally encounter in agents were
missing: Most of the person was hidden from view, including her face and body,
and she never spoke or interacted with the infant. Thus, hiding the actor’s skin re-
moved one of a limited set of perceptual attributes, and, given its salience for
adults, it may have been a particularly important one for infants.
If infants identify agents based on the weight of the perceptual evidence, then
providing more featural support might enable them to understand the gloved
reaches. To test this possibility, in Studies 2 and 3 we provided infants with addi-
tional information about the gloved hands—highlighting the fact that the hands
were part of a person. In Study 2, this information was given prior to the habitua-
tion procedure. In Study 3, this information was included as part of the habituation
and test events. In each study, all infants were shown gloved reaching events, and
the question of interest was whether these additional sources of information sup-
ported their interpretation of the gloved grasps as goal directed.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants. Forty infants, recruited as in Study 1, participated in Study 2.
Twenty infants were 7-month-olds, and 20 infants were 12-month-olds. The 6 girls
and 14 boys in the 7-month-old group were between 6 months, 13 days and 7
months, 30 days old (M = 7 months, 2 days). The 10 girls and 10 boys in the
12-month-old group ranged in age from 11 months, 0 days to 12 months, 21 days
(M = 12 months, 1 day). Five additional infants began the procedure but were elim-
inated from the final sample due to failure to complete all trials (n = 2) or due to ex-
perimenter error (n = 3).
Procedure. Prior to the habituation task, each infant participated in a pre-
exposure phase in the waiting room. Wearing gold gloves on both hands, the actor
interacted with the infant for a period of 5 min. She handed toys to the infant
and manipulated puzzles and other games while attempting to ensure that the in-
fant noticed the gloves. Because we observed individual variation in the extent to
which infants seemed to notice the gloves, we subsequently coded the videotape of
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this phase.4 An observer who was not aware of the infants’ habituation perfor-
mance coded the number and duration of infants’ looks toward the gloves and the
number of times infants alternated gaze between the gloves and the actor’s face.
The first of these indicated the extent to which infants attended to the gloves, and
the second served as an index of the extent to which infants related the gloves to the
person who wore them. To assess reliability, a second independent observer coded
the tapes of 9 infants. The two observers were strongly correlated in their assess-
ments of the average length of look (r = .99) and the number of alternating looks
(r = .84).
After the preexposure phase, the actor and infant moved to the habituation room
to begin the habituation procedure. The habituation procedure was identical to the
gloved hand condition in Study 1. Ten infants at each age saw the actor reach to the
right side of the stage during habituation, and 10 saw her grasp the bear during ha-
bituation. Ten infants at 7 months and 11 infants at 12 months began the test phase
with a new object trial.
As in Study 1, reliability was assessed by having a second observer code each
infant from the videotape. The two observers were correlated in their judgments of
infants’ looking times on the two kinds of test trials (r = .90). The second observer
agreed with the live observer on 79% of the trial endings for 7-month-olds and
92% of the trial endings for 12-month-olds. The direction of these disagreements
was randomly distributed across trial types at both 7 and 12 months, Fisher’s exact
test, p > .99 and p > .40, respectively.
Results
Table 2 summarizes infants’ looking times during the habituation procedure. The
two age groups did not differ in the number of trials required to meet criterion or in
their looking times during habituation. An ANOVA comparing the two age groups
on the first and last three habituation trials revealed only a main effect of trial, F(5,
190) = 12.08, p < .0001, reflecting a decline in looking across the habituation
phase. Five 7-month-olds and one 12-month-old reached 14 habituation trials
without meeting the habituation criterion.
Preliminary analyses revealed no reliable effects on infants’differential respond-
ing to the two test eventsbasedon thesexof the infant, the typeof test eventpresented
first, the side to which the actor reached during habituation, or the toy grasped during
habituation. Therefore, subsequent analyses collapsed across these dimensions. An
ANOVAwithagegroup(7monthsvs.12months)as thebetween-subjects factorand
test trial type (new object vs. new side) as the within-subjects factor yielded no reli-
ableeffects.Separatepairedcomparisons indicated thatneitheragegroupdifferenti-
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ated between the two types of test trials, t(19) = 0.02, p > .9 at 12 months, and t(19) =
0.34,p>.7at7months.Relative to the last threehabituation trials,12-month-olds re-
covered on both new object trials, t(19) = 5.63, p < .0001, and new side trials, t(19) =
4.59, p < .002 trials, and 7-month-olds recovered on neither kind of test trial, t(19) =
1.87, p < .07 for new object trials, and t(19) = 0.82, p > .4 for new side trials. These re-
sults suggest that prior experience with the gloved experimenter did not strongly im-
pact infants’ subsequent responses to the gloved reaching events.
However, infants varied in the extent to which they seemed to notice the gloves
during the preexposure phase. Some infants glanced at them only briefly, whereas
others stared at them for long periods of time. Some infants repeatedly looked back
and forth between the experimenter’s gloved hands and face, whereas others sel-
dom or never did this. Table 3 summarizes these responses for the two age groups.
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TABLE 2
Attention During Habituation Trials and the Three Test Trials of Each Type




Average Looking Time (in Sec)
Habituation Test Trials
First 3 Last 3 New Side New Object
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
Age group
7 months 9.9 0.7 10.2 1.3 5.6 1.0 6.8 1.4 7.1 1.0
12 months 8.2 0.6 9.0 1.4 3.8 0.5 7.7 1.3 7.7 1.3
Preexposure
High monitora 8.9 1.0 8.2 1.0 3.5 0.3 4.8 0.9 7.5 1.8
Low monitorb 8.7 0.5 10.4 1.5 5.3 0.9 8.7 1.4 7.7 1.0
an = 11. bn = 24.
TABLE 3
Infants’ Attention to the Gloved Experimenter During the Preexposure
Phase of Study 3
Range M Mdn
Means length (in sec) of looks to the experimenter’s hands
Overall 1.5–23.4 9.2 6.6
7 months 1.5–20.5 8.0 5.6
12 months 4.4–23.4 10.1 8.0
No. of gaze shifts between the experimenter’s hands and face
Overall 0–16 5 4
7 months 0–14 5 2
12 months 0–16 6 4
We therefore next asked whether those infants who were especially attentive to the
gloves during the preexposure phase responded more systematically on test trials.
Seven- and 12-month-olds differed neither in their average length of glance to the
gloves, t(33) = 1.02, p > .31, nor in the number of gaze alternations between the ex-
perimenter’s hands and face, t(33) = 0.6, p > .5. Eleven infants (five 7-month-olds
and six 12-month-olds) were above the median on both measures, henceforth
called the high-monitoring group. Habituation responses were analyzed for the
high-monitoring infants versus the rest of the sample, henceforth called the
low-monitoring group (see Table 2). An ANOVA with training status (high vs. low
monitoring) as the between-subjects factor and trial type as the within-subjects
factor revealed a significant Training Status × Trial Type interaction, F(1, 33) =
4.63, p < .05.5 High-monitoring infants tended to look longer on new object trials
than on new side trials, t(10) = 2.05, p = .07, whereas low-monitoring infants did
not differentiate between the test events, t(23) = 1.04, p > .3. Relative to the last
three habituation trials, high-monitoring infants recovered on new object trials,
t(10) = 2.83, p < .05, but not on new side trials, t(10) = 1.23, p > .2. Low-monitor-
ing infants recovered on both kinds of test trials, t(23) = 4.09, p < .005 for new ob-
ject trials, and t(23) = 3.35, p < .0005 for new side trials.
Discussion
As a group, neither the 7-month-olds nor the 12-month-olds encoded the gloved
reaches as being goal directed. This finding reinforces the findings of Study 1 in in-
dicating that disrupting the surface features of the hand disrupted infants’ interpre-
tation of the grasping events. Moreover, the findings of Study 2 indicate that, in
general, prior experience with the gloved experimenter did not alter infants’ re-
sponses to the gloved reaching events. However, we found that infants who had
closely monitored the gloves during preexposure differed in their responses from
infants who did not closely monitor the gloves. This subset of infants showed a
trend consistent with their interpreting the gloved reaches as goal directed. It
seems as if some infants were able to draw on prior experience to make sense of the
gloved hands, but other infants did not pick up on the information they needed dur-
ing the preexposure. These considerations motivated the third study.
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we attempted to ensure that infants could readily discern that the gloved
hands were attached to a person. To do this, we presented the relevant information
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during the experimental events. Throughout the procedure, infants viewed the
gloved experimenter from the waist up and could therefore readily observe that the
gloved hands were part of a person. Given this configuration, infants viewed events
in which the actor’s gaze was coordinated with her gloved grasp. In interpreting the
findings, therefore, we anticipated needing to consider how infants’ knowledge
about gaze might have contributed to their responses. With this need in mind, we
tested infants at three ages—7, 9, and 12 months—to parallel the ages at which
prior work had investigated infants’ sensitivity to the object directedness of gaze
(Woodward, 2003).
Method
Participants. Sixty infants, recruited as in Studies 1 and 2, participated in
Study 3. Twenty infants were tested at each of three ages: 7, 9, and 12 months. The
7-month-olds ranged in age from 6 months, 0 days to 8 months, 0 days (M = 7
months, 4 days); the 9-month-olds ranged in age from 8 months, 0 days to 10
months, 1 day (M = 8 months, 26 days); and the 12-month-olds ranged in age from
11 months, 7 days to 12 months, 24 days (M = 12 months, 0 days). There were 7
girls and 13 boys each in the 7- and 9-month age groups, and 10 girls and 10 boys
in the 12-month age group. An additional 9 infants began the procedure but were
excluded from the final sample due to failure to complete all trials (two 7-month-
olds and two 12-month-olds) or due to experimenter error (one 7-month-old and
three 9-month-olds).
Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2 a visual habituation paradigm was used.
However, instead of the actor reaching in from offstage, she sat behind and be-
tween the two toys, with her upper body and face visible to the infant (see Figure
2). The actor wore a red long-sleeved top and metallic gold gloves on both hands.
At the beginning of each trial, the actor made eye contact with the infant and said
“Hi, look!” as she looked at and grasped one of the toys. She then remained still,
looking at and holding the toy until the trial ended. Infants saw the actor grasp the
same toy in the same location on each habituation trial. Ten infants at 7 months, 11
infants at 9 months, and 9 infants at 12 months saw the actor reach to the right side
of the stage. Ten infants at each age saw the actor grasp the bear. As in the first two
studies, infants’ looking was timed beginning when the actor stopped moving in
contact with the toy and ending when the infant looked away for 2 consecutive sec.
The habituation criterion was computed as in Studies 1 and 2.
Following habituation, the positions of the toys were reversed for test trials. In
contrast to Studies 1 and 2, there was no familiarization trial between the habitua-
tion and the test phases because having the actor in the display made this trial awk-
ward. In the test trials, each infant saw three new object and three new side trials in
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alternation. Eleven infants at 7 months and 10 each at 9 and 12 months began with
a new object trial.
As in Studies 1 and 2, reliability was assessed by having a second observer code
each infant from the videotape. The two observers’ judgments of looking times
were strongly correlated (r = .92). The second observer agreed with the live ob-
server on the endpoints of 84% of trials for 7-month-olds, 81% for 9-month-olds,
and 84% for 12-month-olds. The disagreements were distributed randomly across
trial types for each group, Fisher’s exact p > .99, p > .07, and p > .28 at 7, 9, and 12
months, respectively.
Results
Table 4 summarizes infants’ looking times. As in Studies 1 and 2, infants’ looking
times during the first and last three habituation trials were entered into a repeated
measures ANOVA with age group as the between-subjects factor. This analysis re-
vealed a main effect of trial, F(5, 285) = 46.52, p < .0001, and no reliable age ef-
fects. There were no reliable age differences in the number of habituation trials re-
quired to meet criterion. Two infants each at 7 and 9 months and 1 infant at 12
months reached 14 habituation trials without meeting the criterion.
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FIGURE 2 Sample habituation and test events for Experiment 3.
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of the toy grasped during habituation,
the side reached to in habituation, or the test event presented first. Therefore, sub-
sequent analyses collapsed across these factors. An ANOVA with age group (7, 9,
or 12 months) as the between-subjects factor and trial type (new object vs. new
side) as the within-subjects factor revealed a main effect of trial type, F(1, 57) =
6.90, p < .01, indicating longer looking times on new object trials than on new side
trials. The analysis did not indicate that this pattern varied across age groups: Nei-
ther the main effect of age, F(1, 57) = 2.62, p > .08, nor the Age × Condition inter-
action, F(1, 57) = 0.70, p > .5, reached significance.6
Although the ANOVA did not indicate reliable age differences, separate anal-
yses were conducted to test whether each age group reflected the overall pattern
of longer looking times on new object trials than on new side trials.7 These anal-
yses indicated that whereas 12- and 9-month-olds looked reliably longer on new
object trials than on new side trials, t(19) = 4.23, p < .005 at 12 months, and
t(19) = 2.78, p < .05 at 9 months, this pattern was not reliable at 7 months, t(19)
= 0.26, p > .7. Excluding those infants who did not reach the habituation crite-
rion did not change these results. Compared to the final three habituation trials,
12-month-olds recovered on new object trials, t(19) = 6.60, p < .0001, but not on
new side trials, t(19) = 1.79, p > .09; 9-month-olds recovered on both new object
trials, t(19) = 5.00, p < .0001, and new side trials, t(19) = 2.52, p > .05; and
7-month-olds recovered on neither new object trials, t(19) = 1.73, p > .1, nor
new side trials, t(19) = 1.43, p > .1.
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TABLE 4
Attention During Habituation Trials and the Three Test Trials of Each Type





Average Looking Time (in Sec)
Habituation Test Trials
First 3 Last 3 New Side New Object
M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
7 months 8.5 0.7 23.9 3.6 7.7 1.7 8.8 1.3 9.7 1.7
9 months 8.4 0.6 24.3 7.7 7.7 1.4 10.4 1.7 13.7 2.5
12 months 8.1 0.6 13.3 1.5 5.0 0.4 6.5 0.8 8.7 0.7
6The data from the 9-month-olds had positive skew. When the data were log transformed to reduce
this skew, the results of the Age Group × Trial Type ANOVA were similar to those reported for the un-
transformed scores: There was a main effect of trial type, F(1, 57) = 13.79, p < .0005, with neither the
main effect of age group, F(2, 57) = 2.46, p > .09, nor the Age Group × Trial Type interaction, F(2, 57) =
2.64, p > .08, reaching significance.
7The data for the 9-month-olds were first log transformed to correct for skew.
Further analyses indicated a sex difference at 7 months, but not at the other two
ages: A Sex × Trial Type ANOVA conducted at 7 months revealed a Sex × Trial
Type interaction, F(1, 18) = 9.83, p < .01. Follow-up analyses revealed that
7-month-old girls looked longer on new object (M = 12.3, SE = 3.6) than new side
(M = 7.5, SE = 2.2) trials, t(6) = 2.68, p < .05, but that 7-month-old boys did not dif-
ferentiate between new object (M = 8.3, SE = 1.8) and new side (M = 9.5, SE = 1.6)
trials, t(12) = 1.14, p > .2.
Discussion
When infants observed that the gloved hands were part of a person, they responded
to the goal-directed structure of the gloved reaches. This finding indicates that
rather than responding rigidly based on the presence of perceptual triggers, infants
draw flexibly on information in the context to interpret potentially ambiguous
events. Together with the findings from Study 2, these results suggest that infants
do this more readily when the relevant information accompanies the ambiguous
event rather than precedes it.
The findings of Study 3 also suggest a possible age difference in infants’ re-
sponses. Although the main analysis did not indicate reliable age differences,
when each age group was analyzed separately, an age difference emerged: The
older two age groups responded to the change in the actor–object relation, but as a
group, the youngest infants did not respond in this way. Subsequent analyses sug-
gested that this pattern at 7 months may have been due only to the boys; girls at this
age responded as did the older infants. However, given the relatively small number
of girls (n = 7) tested at this age, further studies are necessary to confirm this sex
difference.
Why might the youngest have been less sensitive than the older infants to the
object directedness of the gloved reaches? One possibility is that the experimental
events were in some way distracting for the 7-month-olds. Perhaps having the ac-
tor’s face visible led infants to attend more to the face and less to the hands, thus
detracting attention from the experimentally relevant aspects of the event. Recent
findings argue against this possibility: When 7-month-olds viewed identical events
in which the actor’s hands were bare they responded by looking longer on new ob-
ject trials than on new side trials, and there was no sex difference in responding in
that study (Woodward, 2003). A second possibility is that the 7-month-olds were
less able than older infants to integrate information about the actor as a whole.
They may have noticed the gloved hands but have been less able than older infants
to recruit information about the rest of the actor to interpret her actions.
The inclusion of gaze in the experimental events raises the question of whether
the findings for 9- and 12-month-olds could be due to gaze alone. Perhaps infants
ignored the odd hands, focusing only the actor’s gaze. If infants understood gaze as
an object-directed action, then this alone might be sufficient to drive the effect.
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Several recent findings suggest that this explanation cannot account for all of the
current findings. To start, when 9-month-olds view gaze alone or gaze accompa-
nied by a pointing gesture, they follow the actor’s line of regard, but do not seem to
encode the actor–object relation (Woodward, 2003; Woodward & Guajardo,
2002). Thus, it is unlikely that gaze alone could have driven the effect at 9 months.
In contrast, 12-month-old infants do respond to the object-directed structure of
gaze (Woodward, 2003). However, infants at this age do not ignore the manual ac-
tions that accompany gaze. When gaze accompanies causally implausible actions,
12-month-olds do not respond based on gaze alone (Sommerville & Woodward, in
press; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the first study, we asked whether disrupting the typical surface features of a hu-
man hand would influence infants’ sensitivity to the goal directedness of its ac-
tions. Replicating prior results, we found that when 7- and 12-month-old infants
viewed a bare hand reach through a curtain to grasp a toy, they encoded this event
in terms of the relation between the hand and its goal. However, when infants
viewed the same events with a gloved hand, they did not respond in this way. The
gloved and bare hand events were identical on many dimensions, including the
motion of the actor’s hand and the way in which the hand articulated on the object.
Nevertheless, infants interpreted the gloved and bare hand events differently. Be-
cause infants’ overall levels of looking did not differ in the two conditions, this
finding seems not to be due to infants having a strong preference for or aversion to
the gloved hand relative to the bare hand. Studies 2 and 3 each provided evidence
that additional information about the gloved hands, in particular, the opportunity to
view the actor who wore the gloves, supported infants’ interpretation of the gloved
reaches as goal directed.
Several kinds of motion have been proposed to support infants’ interpretation of
events as goal directed, including biological patterns of motion (Baron-Cohen,
1995), motion around barriers in pursuit of goals (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995), con-
tingent responding to the actions of social partners (S. Johnson et al., 1998;
Kuhlmeier et al., 2003b), and self-propelledness (Premack, 1990). None of these
on its own accounts for the current findings. Biological motion was present in each
of the experimental events, and motion around barriers was present in none of
them. Therefore these features cannot account for infants’ differential responding
across studies and conditions. There was no information about social contingency
in the events for Study 1 and minimal contingency information in Study 3.8 There-
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8Although the actor greeted the infant at the start of each trial, she did not engage in sustained con-
tingent responding to the infant’s actions.
fore, this factor cannot account for infants’ differential responding to the gloved
and bare hand reaches. Information about self-propelledness varied across the ex-
periments but nevertheless seems unlikely to account for the findings. For one, the
gloved and bare hand events in Study 1 were equally ambiguous with respect to the
self- propelledness of the arm and nevertheless infants responded differentially to
them. In addition, other recent findings indicate that self-propelledness is neither
sufficient (Shimizu & Johnson, 2004) nor necessary (Csibra et al., 1999) to support
goal attribution in older infants.
Taken together, these findings indicate that surface features are relevant to in-
fants’ determination that an entity is an agent, thereby calling into question the
claim that motion properties provide the sole means by which infants identify
goal-directed agents. However, we do not conclude from these findings that
self-propelled motion or other patterns of motion are unimportant sources of infor-
mation for infants. Nor do we conclude that familiar surface features must be pres-
ent for infants to identify an object as a potential agent. Indeed, the results of
Studies 2 and 3 indicated that infants were sometimes able to interpret the gloved
reaches as goal directed when given the chance to observe more of the actor who
wore the gloves. Rather, we conclude that infants, like adults, draw on their knowl-
edge of the rich perceptual attributes of agents when making sense of novel events.
These attributes include not only patterns of motion but also typical surface
features.
A potential alternative explanation for these findings is that the glove did not
disrupt infants’ determination that the hand was part of an agent but instead dis-
rupted their ability to identify the grasp as a goal-directed action. Perhaps infants
identified the gloved hands as parts of a person but were uncertain what the pur-
pose of the gloved grasp was. Consistent with this possibility, several studies have
found that infants sometimes fail to represent unfamiliar hand gestures as goal di-
rected (Woodward, 1999; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002; but see Jovanovic et al.,
2003; Király et al., 2003). In this case, the prior experience with the gloved actor in
Study 2 and the additional information provided by the fully visible actor in Study
3 might have clarified the goal of the action rather than the identity of the actor.
This possibility is consistent with the general conclusion that infants’ initial ac-
tion knowledge is not wholly abstract but instead is constrained by their knowledge
of real agents and their actions. However, although it is possible that confusion about
theactioncontributed to infants’responses in theglovedcondition,wedonotbelieve
that this explanation fully accounts for the findings. For one, we find it significant
that infants’propensity to alternate gaze between the actor’s face and hands in Study
2 was related to their subsequent interpretation of the gloved reaches as goal di-
rected. This suggests that integrating information about the agent mattered for in-
fants’ responses. Moreover, the additional behavioral evidence provided in Study 3
has not been effective in leading infants to interpret ambiguous actions as goal di-
rected in other studies. Specifically, when 9- through 12-month-old infants observe
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gaze and posture shifts that are coordinated with unfamiliar or ambiguous manual
actions, they do not interpret these actions as goal directed (Sommerville & Wood-
ward, in press; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000). Therefore, we conclude that al-
though confusion about the action itself may have contributed to infants’ responses
to the gloved reach, confusion about the nature of the agent also contributed to these
responses.
We turn now to considering how these findings relate to the literature, reviewed
earlier, on infants’ interpretation of unusual agents, beginning with the findings for
7-month-olds. The finding that 7-month-olds did not readily respond to the gloved
events as goal directed is quite consistent with the existing literature. Studies test-
ing 5- to 7-month-old infants have shown that they are sensitive to the goal struc-
ture of certain human actions when they are performed by bare-handed actors, con-
sistent with the findings of Study 1 (Jovanovic et al., 2003; Woodward, 1998,
2003). However, when infants at these ages have been tested with computer-gener-
ated shapes or inanimate agents, they have not responded systematically (Csibra et
al., 1999; Jovanovic et al., 2003; Woodward, 1998). Studies that find that infants
respond to novel entities as agents have tested older infants, mainly at 12 months or
older (Gergely et al., 1995; S. Johnson et al., 2001; S. Johnson et al., 1998;
Kuhlmeier et al., 2003b; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004), although there are two reports
of infants as young as 9 months showing this kind of response (Csibra et al., 1999;
Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003a). Taken together, these findings suggest that
infants’ initial sensitivity to the goal structure of action is tightly linked to the most
typical agents in their environment, that is, humans.
In contrast, these findings for 12-month-olds appear to be inconsistent with sev-
eral other findings. Whereas the results of Studies 1 and 2 indicate that 12-month-
olds are limited in their ability to interpret unusual entities as agents, other studies
report that 12-month-olds respond to unusual entities as if they were agents given
certain kinds of behavioral evidence; for example, when objects move around ap-
parent barriers to reach goals (Csibra et al., 2003; Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et al.,
1995), when they engage in apparent attempts to help or hinder the movement of
another object (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003b), or when they participate in contingent so-
cial interactions (S. Johnson et al., 2001; S. Johnson et al., 1998; Shimizu & John-
son, 2004). These considerations suggest that by the end of the first year of life, in-
fants possess relatively abstract knowledge about how agents behave and that, in
some cases, this knowledge informs infants’ detection of agents. Thus, one possi-
ble reason for the disparity in findings may be the different kinds of behavioral evi-
dence present in the experimental events. The events in these studies did not show
infants gloved hands that avoided obstacles or engaged in social behavior. Perhaps
if they had, the 12-month-old infants would have interpreted their actions as goal
directed. Further studies are needed to test this possibility.
However, these findings, along with other recent findings, make clear that
12-month-olds do not depend solely on patterns of motion to identify agents. To
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start, the fact that 12-month-olds interpreted the bare-handed grasps as goal di-
rected indicates that agent detection can occur in the absence of obstacle avoid-
ance, helping behaviors, or contingent responding. In addition, the fact that the
glove disrupted 12-month-olds’ responding in Studies 1 and 2 indicates that these
infants recruit information about surface attributes to identify potential agents.
Moreover, other studies report that adding surface features typical of familiar
agents to a novel entity can lead older infants to treat it as an agent. For example,
Johnson and her colleagues (S. Johnson et al., 2001; S. Johnson et al., 1998) have
found that in addition to contingent responsiveness, facial features contribute to
12- and 15-month-old infants’ propensity to respond to unusual entities as if they
were agents. Consistent with this finding, Kuhlmeier et al. (2003a) reported that
9-month-old infants responded to animated geometric figures as if they were
agents when the figures had faces but not when they lacked faces.
Taken together, these findings suggest that infants’ action knowledge is initially
constrained by the details of particular agents and their actions and becomes more
abstract and flexible with development. There are at least two conclusions that can
be drawn from these findings. The first is that infants possess abstract, innate con-
ceptions of agents and intentional action but that this knowledge is only expressed
as infants discover the real-world cases that embody these principles. This is analo-
gous to the argument that children are born with innate grammars for language that
are only evident once they have acquired the linking rules that specify how this
grammar is embodied in natural language. If this were the case, these findings
would reflect the gradual emergence of the “linking rules” rather than the gradual
emergence of abstract knowledge.
To our mind, a compelling alternative is that abstract action knowledge is con-
structed in development from concrete beginnings. This more abstract knowledge
may then provide a basis for infants’ interpretation of events in which novel entities
act like agents. This account, which posits abstract knowledge as the product rather
than the foundation of development is analogous to recent suggestions that grammar
arises from similar processes (Tomasello, 2001). As is the case for grammar, several
kinds of cognitive processes seem likely to contribute to the construction of action
knowledge, including statistical learning (Baldwin & Baird, 2001), associative
learning (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001), and structure mapping (Gentner & Me-
dina, 1998). Moreover, infants’emerging agentive experience may contribute to the
development of action knowledge (Meltzoff, 2002; Sommerville & Woodward, in
press; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, in press). The pursuit of these possi-
bilities is a critical direction for future investigation.
CONCLUSION
We began by noting that in mature systems, knowledge about the typical attributes
of real-world agents travels with and informs reasoning about their abstract attrib-
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utes. It has been argued that these two aspects of mature knowledge do not emerge
together in ontogeny. Specifically, it has been proposed that infants begin with ab-
stract systems for detecting intentions that are not initially linked to knowledge
about real-world agents. The findings reported here call these proposals into ques-
tion. Across three studies, we found that 7- to 12-month-old infants drew on the
surface attributes of real-world agents in determining whether an observed action
is goal directed. These findings raise the possibility that infants’ experiences with
(and perhaps as) real-world agents play a formative role in the development of in-
tentional action knowledge.
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